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CORRESPONDENCE 
Postmodern Constitutionalism as Materialism 
Francis J. Mootz III* 
Professor J.M. Balkin's recent essay in the Michigan Law Review 1 
assesses the implications that postmodernism holds for constitutional 
law. Although I agree with Balkin about many of the specific issues 
that he believes must be addressed in a postmodern constitutionalism, 
I find that his manner of talking about postmodernism is unproductive 
in an important way. Balkin quite correctly argues that a postmodern 
constitutionalism should not mimic the fragmented and superficial 
culture of postmodernity, nor should it devolve simply to normative 
claims that postmodernity is desirable and should be embraced or 
adopted within the law. However, Balkin's thesis that a postmodern 
constitutionalism must focus on the material determinants of social 
life is an ambiguous, if not troubling, alternative. Postmodern thought 
recognizes that all understanding is context-specific, but this very les-
son cautions against attempting to decode the material features of our 
social context in order to understand ourselves. I shall attempt to ex-
plain my reservations about Balkin's postmodern constitutionalism as 
clearly and concisely as Balkin has written his essay. 
Balkin begins by distinguishing different facets of postmodernism. 
He regards the culture of postmodernity as the primary feature of 
postmodernism. Postmodernity "is the era of mass culture and 
mediazation" that has produced cultural artifacts exemplifying "frag-
mentation, diffusion, and emphasis on surface."2 Balkin stresses that 
the culture of postmodernity is not a result of the triumph of progres-
sive politics. Postmodernity is a sociological fact that exhibits both 
reactionary and progressive elements. Therefore, the fact that the 
Supreme Court is becoming increasingly reactionary is not inconsis-
tent with the fact that our legal culture is postmodern. Balkin regards 
• Assistant Professor, Western New England College School of Law. B.A. 1983, Notre 
Dame; A.M. 1986 (Philosophy), J.D. 1986, Duke University. - Ed. I am grateful to Jim Gard-
ner, Don Korobkin, and Caren Senter for engaging me in many helpful conversations about the 
ideas in this correspondence. I also would like to thank Jack Balkin for his comments and criti-
cisms of an earlier draft and his willingness to comment on my other works in progress. 
1. J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1966 (1992). 
2. Id. at 1968, 1969. In this regard Balkin describes MTV as a "paradigmatically 
postmodern phenomenon." Id. at 1970. 
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postmodern thought as a different facet of postmodernism. 
Postmodernity is marked by theoretical and critical perspectives that 
simultaneously grow out of the material conditions of the culture at 
large and also provide a vocabulary for comprehending them and re-
flecting on their impact. Postmodern thought challenges prevailing 
epistemologies and ontologies by rejecting the idea that there is a foun-
dation for knowledge other than the historical flux of existence. 
Balkin's central premise is that we can describe the cultural condi-
tion of postmodernity without becoming entangled in the difficult 
problems posed by postmodern thought. He argues that postmodern 
cultural forces "inscribed in ways of living that characterize the late 
twentieth century" are more primordial than the "epistemological 
reading" of postmodernism embodied in postmodern thought, which 
represents a reflective attitude about knowledge.3 Balkin believes that 
his postmodern constitutionalism is immune from the standard criti-
ques leveled at other philosophical orientations "because it is not 
merely a set of beliefs, but also a cultural environment in which beliefs 
occur."4 Postmodernity is a cultural given that exists no matter what 
we may believe, Balkin asserts, and therefore "one does not have to be 
a postmodernist to recognize the pervasive effects of postmodemity in 
our Iives."5 For example, Balkin describes new technologies of infor-
mation collection, collation, and dissemination, and then asks whether 
traditional liberal notions of autonomy that subtend American consti-
tutionalism "continue to make sense in an age where control of infor-
mation processing increasingly means new forms of control over 
individuals."6 Balkin's point is that to focus on epistemological theo-
ries about the Constitution's indeterminate commitment to privacy 
rights is less useful than to describe postmodernity and then explore 
whether privacy is possible given the material features of postindus-
trial society. Balkin argues that epistemological critiques miss the 
point that postmodernity shapes our lives and knowledge regardless of 
whether we adopt a postmodern philosophical position. 
Balkin's project holds a certain appeal. We might avoid, or at least 
put to the side, the messy jurisprudential issues raised by deconstruc-
tion and hermeneutics and instead undertake a practical assessment of 
material social reality and its impact on the legal system. This distinc-
tion is suspect from the start, however, and Balkin experiences diffi-
culty maintaining it. On one hand, he argues that rejecting master 
3. Id. at 1975. 
4. Id. at 1976. 
5. Id. at 1974. 
6. Id. at 1987. 
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narratives and foundational justifications for knowledge must be 
subordinated to examining the deeper effects of the changes wrought 
by material forces. On the other hand, he admits that these forces in 
tum must retrospectively "be interpreted and understood."7 Balkin 
does not explain how we are to investigate (interpret) the material 
forces that shape our lives, nor does he describe the value that this 
interpretation holds for us. Balkin's essay might lead the casual reader 
to believe that empirical sociological inquiry is distinct from and has 
priority over critical reflection and a questioning engagement in legal 
dialogue. I do not believe that Balkin intends such a simplistic and 
misguided approach, but his bifurcation of the "material" and "theo-
retical" facets of postmodernism tends to confuse this issue. 8 Balkin's 
emphasis on the material determinants of knowledge does not free us 
from the epistemological puzzles of postmodern thought. Instead, it 
elevates the importance of these epistemological concerns. 
Balkin's use of the word material is misleading. Although his ref-
erences to the material determinants of knowledge suggest a neo-
Marxist approach, Balkin has subsequently explained that his use of 
material is meant to breach the materialist-idealist distinction alto-
gether.9 Balkin wants his reader to regard our material condition as 
the forms oflife that produce all knowledge. Even granting this quali-
fication, I do not believe that reading such a capacious definition of 
material back into Balkin's essay strengthens his argument. 10 More-
over, Balkin is still drawing a distinction, although the distinction is 
better termed as an opposition of prereflective and reflective experi-
ence. In this correspondence I argue that there are more productive 
7. Id. at 1968. 
8. As a leading deconstructionist legal scholar, Balkin would appear to be the last person one 
would accuse of having postmodemism all wrong. I have found Balkin's work to be closely 
related to my jurisprudential writings. See Francis J. Mootz III, Hermeneutics and the Rule of 
Law: Why the Obvious Is Plausible (Oct. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
It is this backdrop that makes Balkin's essay all the more puzzling to me. 
9. Balkin made this point in a telephone conversation with me in early October 1992. 
10. I am reminded of Paul Ricoeur's assessment of neo-Marxist writings that move away 
from Marx's scientific materialism by greatly expanding the definition of work Ricoeur argues 
that from this perspective work comes to designate "the entire human condition of man, since 
there is nothing that man effects but by a toilsome act; there is nothing human which is not 
praxis." Paul Ricoeur, Work and the Word, in EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND POLIT-
ICAL THEORY: A READER 36, 37 (Hwa Yo! Jung ed., 1972) (reprinted from PAUL RICOEUR, 
HisroRY AND TRUTH 197-219 (Charles A. Kelbley trans., 1965)). As Ricoeur indicates, a "no-
tion which signifies everything no longer signifies anything." Id. at 38. 
Ricoeur's theme is closely related to my argument. Ricoeur asserts that "there is not a king-
dom of work and an empire of the spoken word which would set bounds to each other from 
without, but there is a power of the spoken word which traverses and penetrates everything 
human, including the machine, the utensil, and the hand." Id. at 39. The word is a "critique of 
work . . . . It assumes an aloof attitude, it reflects." Id. at 43. 
518 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:515 
postmodern readings of the relationship of prereflective life and reflec-
tive praxis. 
Balkin provocatively characterizes postmodern thought as a "par-
tial continuation of the Enlightenment" that seeks emancipation from 
"the chains created by science, technology, and rationality, which in 
the course of liberating us subjected us to new forms of control, bu-
reaucracy, mediazation, suburbanization, and surveillance."11 The 
task of a postmodern constitutionalism is to determine how these ma-
terial "chains" have affected the institution of law. Balkin apparently 
believes that there has been an epochal transformation from modernity 
to postmodemity and that this transformation has called forth 
postmodern thought as an evolutionary revision of the Enlightenment 
project. He contends that the character of postmodern thought is less 
important than the new culture of postmodemity, whose material 
forces transform us regardless of what beliefs we hold. In contrast, I 
believe that the material forces of contemporary society are a continu-
ing development of the modem era and that postmodern thought is an 
epochal shift that attempts to deal with modernity on radically differ-
ent terms than those proposed by Enlightenment thought. 12 Conse-
quently, a postmodern constitutionalism should remain closely allied 
with the critical perspectives of postmodern thought. 
I begin by questioning whether moving beyond epistemological cri-
tiques in order to confront the material factors that shape and change 
social practices makes sense. Balkin presses this agenda by arguing 
that the material features of industrialization were just as important to 
the modem era as was the self-understanding embodied in the ideals of 
Enlightenment. As evidence for this claim, Balkin points to the trans-
formation through technology of fundamentalist cultures that remain 
steadfastly opposed to the Enlightenment commitment to rational, sci-
entific knowledge. But surely this example cuts the other way: the 
technological colonization of the rest of the world by European and 
North American countries has not rendered these foreign cultures 
modern in the way that this term is understood in western cultures. 
Foreign cultures are not sundered from their traditions by the univer-
salizing imperatives of scientific thought and technology. Rather, 
technology becomes rooted in the tradition it invades, even as it spurs 
new developments within that tradition. The material forces of cul-
11. Balkin, supra note l, at 1988-89. 
12. See MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE EXPERIENCS OF 
MODERNITY (1982) (arguing that modernity stretches from the sixteenth century to the present 
and that epochal shifts mark the manner in which we define and cope with this evolving modern 
era). 
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tural life undoubtedly are tremendously important resources in the 
continual process of defining a society, but they are not brute determi-
nants. We should not relegate critical reflection to the background of 
inquiry in favor of sociological descriptions of material features of so-
ciety. Rather, we should demand that critical reflection assume a 
more practical task.13 
Recall Balkin's privacy example. The technological threat to pri-
vacy only makes sense as a "threat" from some social conception of 
privacy. The mere presence of new technology does not threaten "pri-
vacy" as such. Postmodern constitutionalism need not reassess pri-
vacy solely because certain technology has been invented. Instead, 
technological development holds a certain significance for our society 
because it fits within our culture in a certain way, revealing stresses 
within the shared view that our society is an amalgam of rights-bear-
ing individuals and also is a functionally organized and administered 
community. If postmodern constitutionalism must take account of the 
13. I do not mean to suggest that reflection is in some way more authentic than life as it is 
lived, nor that we should regard critical reflection as an external power brought to bear on the 
mundane realm of experience. Reflection simply is unavoidable once we come to regard life as 
puzzling. See infra note 17. Reflection is an effort to recover, articulate and explore the pre-
reflective significance that lived experience holds for us. See MAURICE MERLEAu-PoNTY, The 
Philosopher and Sociology, in SIGNS 98 (Richard C. McCleary trans., 1964). Merleau-Ponty re-
jects the idea that the social sciences will come to replace critical reflection by addressing them-
selves only to the "facts,'' and he also rejects the idea that philosophy is unconnected to 
sociological understanding. 
The sociologist philosophizes every time he is required to not only record but comprehend 
the facts. At the moment of interpretation, he is already a philosopher .... 
. • . The philosopher thinks about his experience and his world. Except by decree, how 
could he be given the right to forget what science says about this same experience and 
world? Under the collective noun "science" there is nothing other than a systematic han-
dling and a methodical use - narrower and broader, more and less discerning - of this 
same experience which begins with our first perception .... 
. . • Accordingly, we must not simply say that philosophy is compatible with sociology, 
but that it is necessary to it as a constant reminder of its tasks; and that each time the 
sociologist returns to the living sources of his knowledge, to what operates within him as a 
means of understanding the forms of culture most remote from him, he practices philosophy 
spontaneously. Philosophy is not a particular body of knowledge; it is the vigilance which 
does not let us forget the source of all knowledge. 
Id. at 101-02, 110. 
Merleau-Ponty sees the task of reflection as plunging "into the perceptible, into time and 
history, toward their articulations. It does not surpass them through forces it has in its own 
right; it surpasses them only in their meaning." MAURICE MERLEAU-PoNTY, Introduction, in 
SIGNS, supra, at 3, 21. History is not the progression of material social structures, nor is it the 
march of a disembodied reason. 
Why ask if history is made by men or by things, since it is obvious that human initiatives do 
not annul the weight of things, and the 'force of things" always acts through men? It is just 
this failure of analysis, when it tries to bring everything down to one level, which reveals 
history's true milieu. There is no "last analysis,'' because there is a flesh of history in which 
(as in our own body) everything counts and has a bearing - the infrastructure, our idea of 
it, and above all the perpetual exchanges between the two in which the weight of things 
becomes a sign as well, thoughts become forces, and the balance of the two becomes events. 
Id. at 20. 
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material forces that shape our lives in mundane and practical ways, 
then inevitably it must also take account of both the significance that 
these forces hold for us and the ways that they are understood. I do 
not understand Balkin's assertion that "it is neither our shared ideas 
nor their social construction that become the key issues, but rather 
technological change and who has control over its shape and direc-
tion." 14 If all knowledge is acquired only through our inherence in a 
historical, material situation, then our efforts to understand this situa-
tion cannot help but invoke and critique shared perspectives.15 
Balkin does acknowledge that material forces need "to be studied 
to understand how culture has changed for better or worse" under 
their influences, and that critical theory provides the necessary "gen-
eral perspectives for interpreting and evaluating culture and the prod-
ucts of culture."16 But the relationship of social fact and social theory 
is more immediate than Balkin suggests. We cannot avoid gripping, 
and being gripped by, a critical theoretical perspective if we pursue the 
question of postmodernity. Simply by asking how postmodern cul-
tural forces are affecting legal practice, we adopt a critical and inter-
pretive posture toward the social conceptions that define these forces. 
Otherwise, the question simply would not occur to us, and we would 
not have "postmodernity": we instead would have diffuse and un-
thematized social experience.17 By talking about postmodemism, 
Balkin has adopted a critical perspective on contemporary American 
14. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1988. 
15. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology demonstrates how we can accept that knowledge is pos-
sible only on account of our situated, material condition as corporeal beings without falling prey 
to materialism. See MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 70 (Colin 
Smith trans., 1962) (arguing that our bodily comportment in the world is the source of all knowl-
edge but that modern thought wrongly regards the "body, which is my point of view upon the 
world, as one of the objects of that world"). 
16. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1971. 
17. Some might argue that abandoning abstract critical perspectives would leave life pretty 
much as it exists now, but without the useless exercise of philosophical reflection. Talking about 
the end of philosophy is fashionable, but this is often a rhetorically provocative posture rather 
than a meaningful commitment. Certainly philosophy as an academic discipline does not create, 
direct, or justify existence. Such philosophical pretensions are quite ridiculous. However, aban-
doning philosophy in its truest sense - the questioning and challenging encounter with pre-
reflective meaning relations - is a dangerous, unwarranted, and, I believe, difficult proposition 
to carry out. Even the ever-playful deconstructionist, Jacques Derrida, brutally criticizes other 
thinkers in a way that leaves no doubt that he believes doing so is somehow worth his efforts, that 
he is on to something, and that others should listen. 
Devout postmodern legal thinkers inevitably carry forward philosophical reflection. See, e.g., 
Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254 (1992). Patter-
son's article is appropriately titled because it constitutes a third-order philosophical narrative. 
The ordinary language game of law is first the subject of a critical perspective loosely organized 
under the term feminism. In turn, Patterson assesses feminism according to the yardstick of 
postmodernism. The fact that Patterson concludes that a postmodern feminism is one that 
weaves an emancipatory narrative as part of legal practice does not undo the philosophical struc-
ture of his argument. This is not a failing of Patterson's article; things simply cannot be other-
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society and therefore must grapple with all of the issues raised by 
postmodern thought. 
Balkin accurately states that postmodernism involves more than 
merely rejecting philosophical metanarratives by accepting reason and 
knowledge as the products of localized and overlapping language 
games.18 But what does it mean to argue that a postmodern constitu-
tionalism should move beyond epistemological theory and instead 
should focus on the material determinants of social life by asking 
"how postmodern culture and technology have affected law as an in-
stitution"?19 We can pursue this question by considering Balkin's es-
say as an essay. Why was it written? What part does his essay play in 
a postmodern constitutionalism? 
For courts and lawyers to assimilate social changes into constitu-
tional practice (as, for instance, by rearticulating personal privacy 
within a particular context) is one thing, but for Balkin to write about 
this potentiality within legal practice is quite another. If the material 
cultural forces of postmodernity shape legal practice above our want-
ing and willing, what is the point in telling us this? If postmodemity 
effects its full influence only after being interpreted or thematized in 
some manner, what has Balkin told us about how scholars, judges, 
lawyers, and citizens can influence this thematization? Phrased more 
concretely, if Balkin intends to tell lawyers and judges that they 
should read the Constitution in light of evolving cultural practices, has 
he told them something that they do not already know, or has he sug-
gested a strategy that they do not already employ? If Balkin intends to 
provide lawyers and judges with a better method for practicing consti-
tutional law, does he claim to have grasped "postmodernity" in such a 
way as to provide guidance for legal practitioners? Surely, Balkin · 
would concede that the search for a method based on a description of 
reality is the very target of postmodern thought.20 
Addressing these questions requires that we return to the age-old 
dispute in political theory regarding the relationship between 
emancipatory theory and social practice. Postmodern thought is pro-
vocative because it places in question whether theory and practice can 
be segregated to the extent suggested in the framing of such traditional 
questions. Postmodern theorists cannot pretend to decipher the mate-
wise. In fact, I find many similarities between Patterson's philosophical conclusions and my 
own. 
18. Balkin, :supra note 1, at 1975. 
19. Id. at 1978. 
20. See, e.g., HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald 
G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed., Crossroad 1989) (1960). 
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rial determinants of social life; this dog-chasing-its-tail conception of 
theory is a primary target of postmodern critiques. Postmodern the-
ory assumes a more humble task: to reveal practice in a way that 
energizes it. 21 Postmodern thought is significant for law because it 
opens the possibility that legal practice might embody the critical bite 
that is always embedded, but often unrecognized, in legal dialogue. 
Practicing lawyers are no more able than legal theorists to grasp the 
material forces of social life from a distance; a postmodern legal prac-
tice is defined by an open comportment within legal dialogue rather 
than a conscious, rational seizing of the whole situation. Balkin's es-
say is not part of everyday legal practice; it is jurisprudential. To as-
sess its value, we must clarify the relationship between postmodern 
jurisprudence and contemporary legal practice. 
Postmodern jurisprudence rejects the idea that the culture in 
which we live can be separated from the rhetorical means by which we 
represent that culture to ourselves; it also rejects the idea that our the-
oretical perspectives stand aloof from the practices under study. In a 
culture lacking absolute foundations, jurisprudential critique of legal 
practice occurs when we reinterpret habitual thematizations, not from 
the privileged perspective of observer, but from the frontline perspec-
tive of one who shares in the labor of articulating these thematizations. 
Postmodern jurisprudence describes the dialogic character of knowl-
edge and encourages a critical engagement that can lead to new under-
standing of our situation. Critical confrontations are possible only 
within this dynamic, intersubjective rhetorical space. For example, 
postmodern jurisprudence discredits the rhetorical power of original-
ism and attempts to present legal practice in a new light. This effort 
does not simply propound a new method of legal interpretation. In-
stead, it embodies a new way of understanding legal practice as a con-
tinuing dialogue between the demands of the present and our 
habituation in a traditional discourse. Postmodern jurisprudence 
questions the received wisdom about how law is practiced and offers 
instead a nonfoundational, critical account of all understanding, in-
cluding legal understanding, that describes practice in an attempt to 
influence it.22 
21. My characterization of postmodern jurisprudence and postmodern practice follows the 
post-Heideggerian hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur rather than Jacques 
Derrida's deconstruction or Ludwig Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy. See Mootz, 
supra note 8; Francis J. Mootz Ill, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 
WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming Apr. 1993); Francis J. Mootz III, The Ontological Basis of Legal 
Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas and 
Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REv. 523 (1988). 
22. Balkin notes the "increasing insularity, self-absorption, and fragmentation of progressive 
academic writing, and the increasing irrelevance of that writing to the positive law of the U.S. 
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A postmodern legal practice would embody dialogic openness. 
The legal practitioner will never be able to define and take account of 
free-standing technologies that go "forward forever, mindlessly and 
powerfully" as a means of correcting the practice. 23 Rather, 
postmodern constitutionalism must work through the tangled connec-
tions between legal practice and political power that are revealed in 
legal discourse. The discourse of legal practice helps to define our 
world because it is an important venue in which we find our world.24 
Judges cannot help but be aware of increasingly advanced surveillance 
technologies when they decide cases that they regard as implicating 
privacy concerns. However, they are able to confront the problem of 
technological advances only by holding legal dialogue open to the 
broader dialogues about political and social organization in which the 
idea of privacy in postindustrial society is molded. The project of 
postmodern jurisprudence is to cajole decisionmakers to do just that. 
The attack on originalism presents not only a new description of prac-
tice but also a normative injunction that we should free legal practice 
from artificial and unproductive constraints. Postmodern jurispru-
dence is grounded in and descriptive of legal practice as an ongoing 
dialogue. There is no postmodern inquiry outside of or prior to this 
dialogue. 25 
Constitution." Balkin, supra note 1, at 1967. But Balkin's argument contains nothing to con-
vince the reader that his postmodern constitutionalism will be any more successful in shaping 
legal practice. Balkin's essay is not an argument within legal practice in the same way that a 
memorandum of law or doctrinal scholarship might be considered legal practice. Instead, his 
essay is jurisprudential. The task of jurisprudence is to place in question the unexpressed limita-
tions defining practice. 
My argument is that Balkin's essay is useful only if it helps us to see that the limits of contem-
porary legal practice are not limitations inherent in a supposed "nature" of legal practice. 
Postmodern jurisprudence should not move beyond the epistemological battle; it should win the 
battle. Just as the legal realists won the battle against doctrinal formalism, postmodern scholars 
must win the battle against foundationalism, not just on paper but by effecting a change in our 
very comportment within legal dialogue. Postmodern constitutionalism, as contextual legal 
practice, will follow in the wake of this reorientation. 
23. But cf Balkin, supra note 1, at 1989. 
24. Of course, legal practice is not the only venue, nor is it necessarily always an important 
venue. For example, legal dialogue in the area of race relations is now seemingly spent without 
having achieved reconciliation. Admitting this is nothing more than admitting the limitations of 
postmodern constitutionalism and acknowledging that we participate in our culture in roles 
other than lawyer, scholar, or judge. 
25. Balkin criticizes dialogic models of democratic legitimation as "impossible of attainment, 
or even worse, wholly irrelevant" due to "technological changes in dissemination of informa-
tion." Balkin, supra note 1, at 1980. I agree that the ideal of society as a deliberative public 
body, or polis, appears quite naive to us today, but this is not because material social forces 
necessarily preclude democratic dialogue. In fact, the opposite seems true. When communism 
fell in Eastern Europe, observers widely acknowledged that closed societies simply could not 
operate in a technologically advanced culture. Fax machines, video cameras, and satellite feeds 
were all used to break the authoritarian grip on society. The failed reform effort in Beijing was 
put down in large part by removing these technological tools from the hands of the reformers and 
then brutally stifling dissent by physical coercion. The mediazation of American culture does 
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Postmodern constitutionalism cannot postpone normative commit-
ments in favor of bare descriptions of the culture of postmodernity. 
By declaring itself postmodern, legal thought takes a position not only 
on how we acquire knowledge but also on how we should react to this 
new description.26 Justice Scalia's legal opinions should not blithely 
be accepted as symptoms of a fragmented, incoherent culture; they 
should be criticized for spinning a fantasy about the character of legal 
dialogue, a fantasy that ultimately warps the dialogue. Nor should we 
regard postmodern critiques of Justice Scalia's new textualism as epis-
temological niceties that overlook the material forces of postmoder-
nity. The postmodern critique of textualism, plain meaning, 
originalism, and crude Burkean traditionalism ultimately describes 
legal practice as a situated dialogue with a defining history and an 
undetermined future. It recognizes that legal practice cannot help but 
reflect the wider culture, but it also suggests how legal practice can be 
more responsive. Postmodern constitutionalism is not the study of our 
material context. It is a recognition that knowledge emerges from sit-
uated dialogue and a corresponding effort to hold ourselves open to 
this meaning-laden situation. 
I do not dispute Balkin's insistence that a postmodern constitu-
tionalism must be practiced within the specific contexts of our day and 
that these contexts include the powerful effect of technology on our 
lives. Balkin's outline of the effect of postmodern culture is a compel-
ling story. But it is only a story, and a rather simple one at that. We 
not preclude dialogue; in fact, it feeds on the ideals of democratic dialogue even as it warps them. 
Political theorists must address what democratic dialogue means in this environment, but they 
need not abandon the ideal of public debate. 
More importantly, discrediting any notion of dialogism runs counter to the central thrust of 
postmodern thought: all knowledge arises from a situated dialogue. Dialogism is not just a 
model of political legitimation that may or may not be achieved it is a recognition of certain ways 
of being and knowing that can either be facilitated or hindered. 
26. Balkin does not subscribe to the antinormative, radically deconstructive views of some 
postmodern legal scholars. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere To Go, 43 STAN. L. 
REv. 167 (1990); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 
(1991). I believe that Balkin would align himself with Drucilla Cornell's longstanding efforts to 
counter these corrosive theoretical programs that destroy the possibility of ethics as part and 
parcel of their effort to subvert our foundational heritage. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, From the 
Lighthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation, in LEGAL 
HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 147, 156 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992). Nev-
ertheless, Balkin does separate ethical (normative) prescriptions from a description of the mate-
rial conditions of postmodernity. Balkin argues that the culture of postmodernity does not 
compel one vision of how law, medicine, or politics should be practiced. Instead, it serves as the 
material backdrop against which these normative choices are made. Balkin, supra note 1, at 
1973. I am arguing against the idea that we can describe contemporary legal culture - as 
bureaucratized, commodified, and industrialized, for instance - without betraying normative 
commitments about how law should be practiced. Balkin's postmodern constitutionalism fails 
because it presumes that we can stand back and describe our condition as a prelude to formulat-
ing normative commitments, when in fact our descriptions are always symptomatic of normative 
commitments. 
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cannot move from the antifoundationalist epistemology of 
postmodemism to an investigation that looks behind social concep-
tions to the material forces shaping social life. We cannot investigate 
the material features of postmodernity and then set out to change legal 
dialogue. Rather, the lesson of postmodemism is that we can only 
push and be pushed by the situated dialogue itself. 
